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In the ﬁ  rst approach, certainty equivalents (CE) of lotteries are 
determined for various amounts of money and various probabilities. 
Payoffs which are either 0 or x1 (x1 = 100 in Figure 1A) are offered by 
a lottery with a chance to win p = 0.5 or a sure win (“C” in Figure 1A) 
with the participant’s task to choose one option (lottery or sure 
win). The CE is represented by the sure payoff for which a subject 
is indifferent between the two alternatives. Within this framework 
a utility function is determined based on its assumed functional 
form, a probability weighting and an econometric analysis. A key 
problem for econometric analyses is that each model, e.g. Regret 
Theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), Prospect Theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979), or Disappointment Theory (Bell, 1985), assumes 
a distinct functional form for the evaluation of money and prob-
abilities. Consequently, the determination of utility functions for 
risky decisions differs across theoretical approaches. Another short-
coming of the binary lottery approach is that the evaluation of prob-
abilities and money are not fully separable. Thus, risk aversion can 
be attributed either to the shape of the utility function or to the 
 probability weighting. The statement of Prospect Theory that indi-
viduals are risk averse for positive payoffs or high probabilities there-
fore depends crucially on the assumptions of econometric analysis. 
On the other hand, one of this method’s advantages is that agents 
really decide between options which lead to payoffs.
In the second approach, the bisection method, agents are asked 
to specify differences in the utility associated with monetary pay-
offs. In this method, a utility function is elicited by determining 
INTRODUCTION
The concept of utility functions is fundamental to economics. Utility 
features prominent in most economic theories, as it is not a good’s 
quantity or money per se that determines the actions of human beings, 
so called agents, but the utility they obtain from the good. Equilibrium 
concepts like the Nash equilibrium for strategic interactions of agents, 
the Walrasian equilibrium of economies, ﬁ  nancial theory or the the-
ory of political decision making are based on utility considerations. 
Expected utility theory and its modiﬁ  cations like Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) are the most established theories for 
decision making under risk. Utility theory is well-founded by an axi-
omatic approach with few intuitive axioms. In contrast to its theoreti-
cal importance, a generally accepted procedure how to measure utility 
does not yet exist. The need to have a method for determining utility 
functions is obvious, since violations of expected utility theory are 
frequent, in particular in the area of risky decision making. Without 
a generally accepted approach for identifying utility, it is impossible 
to ﬁ  gure out which theoretical predictions made by utility function 
related models do not ﬁ  t observed decision making processes and 
hence many predictions of economic models are neither testable nor 
implementable. Several key questions have therefore be answered: Is 
the concept of utility functions a normative construct, does it capture 
the key features of decision making processes or is it just a tool for 
describing behavioral data?
In the present paper we focus on the utility of money. Two main 
methods to determine the utility of money are discussed in the 
literature: the evaluation of lotteries and the bisection method.
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mean points of utility between two utility values, which are x1 
and 0 in Figure 1. One possibility is, to present agents with two 
amounts of money, x1 and 0, and ask them which amount of 
money M divides the utility difference u(x1) −u(0) into halves, i.e. 
u(M) = (u(x1) + u(0))/2 = u(x1)/2. It is also feasible to show a third 
amount of money x3 (“C” in Figure 1) and to ask if this value divides 
the difference of x1 and 0 into halves [(u(x1) + u(0))/2 = u(M)]. 
To achieve a monetary valuation without using lotteries, subjects 
are asked to evaluate their perceived “happiness that money brings” 
(Galanter, 1962). In the present study the term “joy” is used (asso-
ciated with receiving a speciﬁ  ed amount of money) in order to 
induce a monetary valuation context. By varying the parameters, 
a utility function can be obtained. This method’s advantage is that 
the resulting utility function does not depend on probabilities and 
the speciﬁ  cation of a functional form, meaning that no theoretical 
presumptions are required. Its disadvantage is that decisions are 
neither connected to monetary nor to hypothetical payoffs.
Both methods have been widely used and discussed in the lit-
erature. In most studies in experimental economics the evaluation 
of lotteries is used to determine utility functions or to test theo-
ries. The key argument for preferring the lottery method over the 
bisection method is that economic decisions should involve mon-
etary payoffs, otherwise the decisions “are not for real”. Figure 2 
 illustrates the theoretical foundation for both procedures. By asking 
for the CE or the midpoint the value on the x-axis is determined, 
i.e. CE or M, respectively. The value u(CE) or u(M) on the y-axis 
is not given. For the bisection task it is by deﬁ  nition half of the 
utility of x1. In the lottery condition this value depends on the 
theory describing the evaluation of lotteries. In Prospect Theory 
for example it is Π(0.5)*u(x1). If the probability weight Π(0.5) is 
small enough one might also obtain a linear utility function even 
if the CE is below the expected value. Therefore one has to know 
Π(0.5) if one wants to determine the utility function by means of 
the lottery method. Assuming that both methods are based on the 
same utility function one could combine both methods to ﬁ  rst 
get the utility function by means of the bisection method and 
then determine the probability weight of 0.5. This procedure can 
also be applied to probabilities different from 0.5, enabling one to 
determine a probability weighting function, and a utility function 
experimentally by combining both methods.
While economic scientists have pointed out differences between 
the two methods, e.g. stating that decisions in the bisection task are 
not for real, such difference might better be captured from a cogni-
tive neuroscience point of view. Moreover, a cognitive neuroscience 
approach to this problem may also reveal differences in the neural 
processes involved in the two decision methods. In human beings 
decision making processes are supervised “online” by cognitive 
control mechanisms enabling adaptive behavior in a most ﬂ  exible 
manner (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Botvinick, 2007). Typical simple 
situations in which these mechanisms have been studied involve 
response selection from several action alternatives or the evalua-
tion of currently made decisions. By using event-related potentials 
(ERP) the neural underpinnings of these control mechanisms can 
be revealed. One ERP component related to response evaluation 
processes is the error-related negativity (error related negativity 
(ERN) Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). This compo-
nent was initially described to appear 50 to 100 ms following an 
incorrect response in choice-reaction tasks at fronto-central elec-
trode sites and was postulated to reﬂ  ect the perceived discrepancy 
FIGURE 1 | Prototypical decision task for the binary lottery (A) and the 
bisection task (B).
FIGURE 2 | Theoretical procedure how to determine a utility function if 
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between the intended and the actually performed action. Source 
analysis as well as simultaneous analysis (Dehaene et al., 1994) of 
ERPs and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI, Mathalon 
et al., 2003; Debener et al., 2006) have shown that the ERN is gener-
ated in the anterior cingulate cortex, an area that is closely linked to 
several cognitive control mechanisms involved in decision making 
(Gehring and Knight, 2000; Paus, 2001) and in the processing of 
risk related feedback information (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Cohen 
et al., 2007). Recent investigations have shown that the ERN is also 
sensitive to characteristics in error processing that are not directly 
linked to the violation of objective criteria. For example, an error 
may be more relevant by associating it with the loss of money 
(Hajcak et al., 2005) or by manipulating the participant’s mood 
state (Tucker et al., 1999; Luu et al., 2000; Wiswede et al., 2009). 
These manipulations also inﬂ  uence ERN amplitudes. As Hewig 
et al. (2007) have shown, the high risk choices resulted also in an 
ERN, because such a selection implies a high chance not to get the 
response’s intended outcome and will be processed as an error-
like deviation from advantageous choice strategies. Based on their 
initial approach explaining error processing in terms of reinforce-
ment learning (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; see also Munte et al., 
2007 for electrophysiological evidences) Holroyd and Coles (2008) 
described the occurrence of an ERN in the absence of external 
ascertainable response criteria. Accordingly, responses are matched 
against internal criteria that were formed by individual learning his-
tories and ERN amplitude is driven by the internal classiﬁ  cation of 
a given response as “sub-optimal” (Holroyd and Coles, 2008). The 
ERN thus may reﬂ  ect the subjective value of a potential response.
In the present investigation we use the ERN as a tool to charac-
terize the neural implementation of decisions made in the lottery 
and bisection paradigms. Our prediction is that lottery decisions 
will be associated with increased monitoring, since the payoff 
instruction increases the subjective relevance or value in this task 
which should amplify the ERN amplitude. ERPs in the bisection 
task should not feature an ERN, because here responses have nei-
ther to be matched against set criteria nor are they associated with 
subjective relevance. Thus, we assume that fundamentally different 
neural processes will be engaged by the two methods. Importantly, 
we further ask whether the engagement of such different neural 
processes would also lead to differences in the estimates for the 
utility function of money.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen neurological healthy, right-handed participants gave 
informed consent to take part in the study (10 women, age range 
21–29). Two of these were excluded because of technical problems 
and one participant made no disadvantageous responses in the 
range from 390 to 100 and was excluded from data analysis as well. 
The ﬁ  nal data-set thus comprised 13 participants. They were paid 
€7 per hour. The study protocol had been approved by the ethics 
committee of Magdeburg University.
GENERAL PROCEDURE
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair in front of a 19"-
CRT monitor. A modiﬁ  ed computer mouse was positioned under 
each index ﬁ  nger as a response device. The experiment consisted 
of two sessions which took place within 3–7 days. In both sessions 
identical stimulus material was presented but with differing task 
instructions. Every session began with 20 practice trials to familiar-
ize subjects with the task. Thereafter the session started comprising 
10 blocks of 82 trials each.
TASK
In each trial, lasting between 2700 to 3400 ms, a string of three 
numbers surrounded by a white box was presented (see Figure 3). 
The two outer numbers were shown ﬁ  rst. After 1000 ms, the inner 
number was added and the completed array stayed on the screen 
for another 1000 ms. The array’s left number was always zero. If 
numbers on the right were between 800 and 1000, the mid posi-
tion numbers varied between 100 and 700, in case the right-sided 
numbers were between 1020 and 1200, mid position numbers were 
in the range of 300 to 900. Numbers in the middle were varied in 
steps of 50, right-sided numbers in steps of 20. Before presentation 
numbers within each string were multiplied by 1, 10 or 100, result-
ing in three classes of strings (e.g. “0 350 1120”, “0 3500 11200” and 
“0 35000 112000”).
In the binary lottery task participants had to choose to either get 
the amount of money corresponding to the center number or to 
play a lottery in which the outer numbers were the lottery’s stakes 
played out at a ﬁ  fty-ﬁ  fty chance. Participants were explicitly told 
that the lottery game was hypothetical only; to that effect subjects 
expected no real payoff. They indicated their choices by pressing a 
button with the left or right index ﬁ  nger.
In the bisection task, the outer numbers corresponded to the 
utility interval’s boundaries and the inner number to this interval’s 
center. To keep the emotional framing of the bisection task compa-
rable to the lottery task participants were instructed to imagine for 
each presented number the joy they would feel when getting this 
amount of money in Euro. By pressing the left or right index ﬁ  nger 
(YES/NO) subjects indicated whether the difference in perceived 
joy between the left – this number is always zero- and the center 
number and the center and the right number was felt to be equal 
(YES) or not (NO, see Figure 1). In both conditions subjects did 
not receive any performance feedback.
EEG-RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
The electroencephalogram was recorded from 28 tin electrodes, 
referenced against an electrode place on the left mastoid process, 
mounted in an elastic cap and placed according to the international 
10–20 system. EEG was re-referenced ofﬂ  ine to the mean activity 
at the left and right mastoid processes. All channels were ampliﬁ  ed 
(bandpass 0.05–30 Hz) and digitized with 4 ms resolution. To con-
trol for eye movement artifacts, horizontal and vertical electroocu-
lograms were recorded using bipolar montages. To eliminate eye 
movement contamination from EEG signals we used second order 
blind source separation as described by Joyce et al. (2004; for a com-
parison to other methods see Kierkels et al., 2006). Additionally, 
we controlled for other artifacts, e.g. muscle or heart rate, by visual 
inspection and removed afﬂ  icted epochs if necessary.
The generation of bins for ERP analysis was based on a dif-
ference value calculated for each trail. This difference value was 
computed by subtracting the arithmetic middle of the two outer 
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To give an example the numbers shown in Figure 3 are used: The 
outer numbers of the array are 0 and 1020, the number in the 
center is 350. The arithmetic middle of the two outer numbers is 
(0 + 1020)/2 = 510 and the resulting difference is 350 − 510 = −160. 
The negative value of this difference indicates that the number pre-
sented in the array’s center is smaller than the arithmetic middle of 
the corresponding outer numbers. Accordingly, numbers presented 
in the array’s center larger than the arithmetic middle of the outer 
numbers produce a positive difference value. Based on the differ-
ence values we sorted trials into ﬁ  ve bins including the differences 
390 to 100, 90 to 50, 40 to −40, −50 to −90 and −100 to −400. For 
each of these bins, we computed response-locked averages with an 
epoch-length of 900 ms (baseline −300 to 0) separately for “yes” 
and “no” responses. For each subject, averages were ﬁ  ltered using 
a 1–8 Hz band pass ﬁ  lter before calculating the mean amplitude 
30–70 ms after response for statistical analysis. This time-window 
has been shown to capture the ERN component which typically 
has a maximum around 50 ms. To test for effects, we calculated 
an ANOVA with the factors condition (lottery/center judgement), 
response (yes/no, where “yes” in the lottery condition is related 
to choosing money and “no” choosing the lottery) and bin (ﬁ  ve 
bins) for the electrode site Cz. Signiﬁ  cance values will be reported 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, but the degrees of freedom uncor-
rected. In order to identify conditions causing signiﬁ  cant inter-
actions or main effects the corresponding post-hoc t-tests were 
performed. To adjust the signiﬁ  cance level of one-tailed post-hoc 
t-tests for multiple comparisons α was set to 0.05 and an improved 
Bonferroni procedure based on the ordered p-values was applied 
(Simes, 1986). According to Simes (1986), let p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ … ≤ p(j) 
be the ordered p-values for testing H0 = {H1,H2,..,Hi}. H0 will be 
rejected, whenever pi < i*α/j for i = 1, …, j (see also Samuel-Cahn, 
1996; Sen, 1999 for a critical discussion and Wendt et al., 2007 
for its application on EEG data). According to this procedure we 
grouped our post-hoc-testing into two sets: comparisons for deci-
sions at the indifference point [bin (−40; 40)] and comparisons 
for decisions made at the endpoint [bins (−400; −100) and (100; 
390)]. Correspondingly, we calculated critical p-values for 6 and 
7 post-hoc comparisons. A similar correction was applied to the 
5 post-hoc tests of the behavioral data. The resulting critical values 
are shown in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
We calculated the means µbisection, µlottery and standard deviations 
σbisection, σlottery for the bisection method and the lottery method 
respectively. For the Yes-responses of both methods we determined 
histograms that are representing the best ﬁ  t to a normal or to a 
cumulative normal distribution function. For these histograms we 
calculated means and standard deviations. We tested if the bisec-
tion method’s mean µbisection can be the mean of the distribution 
(histogram) of the data under the lottery condition and if the lot-
tery task’s mean µlottery can be the mean of the distribution under 
the bisection condition.
FIGURE 3 | Experimental paradigm.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 43  |  5
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In a second analysis the same bins as used for the EEG   analysis 
were assessed. Response frequencies were calculated for every par-
ticipant by computing the percentage of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses 
given to each class of difference values. For statistical analysis the 
mean percentage values of ‘yes’ response were used only, since per-
centage values of both response categories are inversely related. For 
global effect testing, we performed a repeated measures ANOVA 
with the factors condition (lottery/center judgement) and bin (ﬁ  ve 
bins, see previous section for details). Signiﬁ  cance values will be 
reported Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, but the degrees of freedom 




Choices made for each class of difference value (in mean  percentage) 
are depicted for the lottery and bisection tasks in Figures 4A,B 
respectively. We ﬁ  tted a normally distributed density function for 
the data in Figure 4A and a normally distributed cumulative distri-
bution function for the data in Figure 4B. This procedure results in 
µbisection = −14.33 and σbisection = 175.74 for the bisection method and 
µlottery = −32.57 and σlottery = 191.97 for the binary lottery method. 
In a t-test the Null hypothesis that µbisection = −32.57 is not rejected 
on the 40% level (absolute t-values are smaller than 0.64). The 
same holds for the Null hypothesis µlottery = −14.33. We observed 
a slightly concave utility function under both conditions (µ < 0) 
which corresponds to risk aversion in the lottery condition. The 
average µ is smaller in the lottery condition, but the difference is 
not signiﬁ  cant.
Collapsing choices into 5 bins as done for the EEG analysis 
clearly illustrates the differences between the tasks (see Figure 4C). 
Statistical analysis for the YES-responses reveals a signiﬁ  cant inter-
action condition by bin (F(4,48) = 33.38, p < 0.001) as well as sig-
niﬁ  cant main effects (condition F(1,12) = 14.39, p = 0.003; bin 
F(4,48) = 32.04, p < 0.001). Comparing bins between conditions 
post-hoc contrasts are signiﬁ  cant for the bins [100; 390] and [50; 
90], but not for the remaining bins [−40; 40], [50; 90] and [100; 
400]. For example, these tests show that the difference in the means 
of the CE and the mean point are not signiﬁ  cant.
EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS
The response-locked grand average ERPs are illustrated in Figure 5. 
A clear negativity with a peak latency at approximately 50 ms and a 
mediofrontal distribution (see Figure 6) akin the ERN component 
emerged in the lottery task for those responses which entailed a 
divergence from the optimal behavior [i.e. choosing the lottery in bin 
(100; 390) and choosing money for bin (−100; −400)]. By contrast, 
obviously incorrect responses to the same bins in the bisection task 
(Figure 5D, “center yes” responses in the bins [−100; −400] and [100; 
390]) resulted in much smaller negativities. The amplitude of these 
negativities was similar to the responses in the indifference range 
(Figure 5C). Statistical analysis of response-locked ERPs resulted in 
signiﬁ  cant interactions condition × response × bin [F(4,48) = 7.18, 
p = 0.002],  condition × response  [F(1,12) = 5.29,  p = 0.03], 
condition × bin  [F(4,48) = 3.23,  p = 0.03]  and  response × bin 
[F(4,48) = 3.91, p = 0.03]. With regard to main effects, only the 
‘condition’ factor became signiﬁ  cant [F(1,12) = 5.78, p = 0.03; for 
the remaining main effects response and bin F < 0.9, p > 0.4]. Post-
hoc comparisons contrasting decisions between bins within and 
between conditions are illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2 | Ordered p-values for the comparison of the mean ERN amplitudes between conditions.
Order Contrast  t-value  pcrit  pemp
1 [−40; 40] choice lottery vs. center no  −1.437 0.008  0.085
2 [−40; 40] choice lottery vs. center yes  −1.09 0.016  0.15
3 [−40; 40] choice lottery vs. choice money  −1.01 0.025 0.16
4 [−40; 40] choice money vs. center no  −0.481 0.033  0.34
5 [−40; 40] center no vs. center yes  0.377  0.041  0.36
6 [−40; 40] choice money vs. center yes  0.015  0.05  0.49
1  [100; 390] choice lottery vs. [100; 390] choice money  −4.55 0.007  <0.001
2  [100; 390] choice lottery vs. [−400;−100] choice money  −3.58 0.014  0.002
3  [100; 390] choice lottery vs. [100; 390] center yes  −3.05 0.021 0.005
4 [−400; −100] choice money vs. [−400; −100] choice lottery  −2.6 0.028  0.011
5  [100; 390] center no vs. [100; 390] center yes  −2.53 0.035 0.011
6 [−400; −100] center no vs. [−400; −100] center yes   −2.42 0.042 0.014
7 [−400; −100] choice money vs. [−400; −100] center yes  −1.7 0.05 0.05
Depicted are all performed contrasts; signiﬁ  cant tests are indicated by pemp values written in bold. The ordering of the critical p-values was performed for the 
indifference point and both endpoints respectively.
Table 1 | Ordered p-values of the comparison of the relative frequency of 
“YES”-responses between conditions.
Order Contrast  t-value  pcrit  pemp
1 [100;  390]  9.47  0.01  <0.001
2 [50;  90]  4.53  0.02  <0.001
3 [−90; −50]  −0.833 0.03  0.21
4 [−40; 40]  −0.345 0.04  0.36
5 [−100; −400]  −0.167 0.05  0.43
Signiﬁ  cant tests are indicated by pemp values written in bold.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 43  |  6
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the ERN for unfavorable money choices increases. Nevertheless, the 
 difference between both conditions remains signiﬁ  cant (one-tailed 
t-test, t = −2.08, df = 12, p = 0.03).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, action monitoring processes as indexed by 
the ERN component were differentially engaged in two decision 
making paradigms that have been frequently used in economic 
sciences to determine the utility of money. This suggests funda-
mental differences between the lottery and bisection methods at the 
cognitive and neural level. More speciﬁ  cally, in the binary lottery 
task a pronounced ERN characterized decisions in favor of the less 
advantageous options at either endpoint of the range of possible 
decisions. That is, an ERN was found for “lottery”-decisions in trials 
that would have yielded a sure win greater than the mean outcome 
of the lottery. Similarly, an ERN was present for “sure win”-deci-
sions in trials in which the mean outcome of the lottery would have 
exceeded the sure win. The occurrence of an ERN in the lottery 
task can be interpreted as evidence for the subjects’ motivational 
participation even though the lottery’s payoffs were only hypotheti-
cal, as it is known from previous research that the appearance of an 
ERN depends on the subjective signiﬁ  cance in a given task (Hajcak 
et al., 2005; Holroyd and Coles, 2008). The difference between the 
trial bins associated with the two most prominent ERNs indicates 
different degrees in action monitoring and is likely caused by the 
interaction of two factors: the difference between expected value 
and sure payoff on the one hand and the risk to sustain a poten-
tial loss on the other. For both kinds of decisions associated with 
an ERN the difference between the expected value of the lottery 
and the sure win was similar. Nevertheless, the ERN’s amplitude 
was larger for disadvantageous lottery decisions compared to the 
disadvantageous selection of a sure payoff. This suggests that the 
anticipation of a risky decision’s potentially negative outcome, 
namely to win nothing instead of getting a small but sure payoff 
in the unfavorable sure win selection, leads to increased activation 
of monitoring mechanisms despite similar expected values. One 
might argue, that this difference is simply caused by the dissimilar 
distances between the indifference point at −30 and the end-bins 
respectively (see Figure 4B). However, the described effect persists 
(albeit somewhat smaller) even when trials were rearranged to yield 
bins that are equidistant to the indifference point. The change in 
ERN amplitude for these rearranged bins is due to the fact that, for 
lottery choices, the bin [70; 340] comprises less disadvantageous 
selections, whereas in the bin [−130; −400] the proportion of unfa-
vorable choices increases. It is to be expected that the corresponding 
ERN amplitudes decrease and increase, respectively.
In contrast to the binary lottery task the bisection task’s incor-
rect responses at the end-bins are associated with a very small 
negative deﬂ  ection, i.e. a rudimentary ERN. Although the ampli-
tudes of these negativities are signiﬁ  cantly different from the end-
bins’ correct choices, the parameter values are indicating a much 
smaller degree of action monitoring involvement (Nieuwenhuis 
et al., 2001; Burle et al., 2008; Heldmann et al., 2008) and are 
similar to the amplitudes observed for the indifference point. 
Based on our previous argumentation the rudimentary ERNs 
can be seen as an indicator for the absence of risk perception in 
these conditions.
Additionally, we checked whether differences in the ERPs seen 
between the unfavorable choices in the lottery task might simply 
be due to a different distance between the indifference point at 
−30 (see Figure 4A) and the respective bins [100;390] and [−100; 
−400]. Therefore, two new bins were obtained according to the 
procedure described in section “EEG-Recording and Analysis”, but 
with new intervals (see Figure 5B), which are equally distant from 
the indifference point. Compared to the original bins the ERN 
amplitude related to the unfavorable lottery choices decreases while 
FIGURE 4 | Behavioral data. Mean percentage of choices are shown for the 
binary lottery (A) and the bisection task (B). The center is indicated by a 
dashed line and refers to the indifference point in the bisection task. (C) 
depicts the cumulated choices per bin for both task. Circles referring to 
“YES”-, squares to “NO”-responses. Indifference point is indicated by a 
dotted line. Please note, that statistical comparisons were only calculated for 
YES responses.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 43  |  7
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In which way are the ERP results able to inform economic 
  reasoning? Looking at the economic starting point of our analy-
sis shown in Figure 1 we discussed the differences and similarities 
between the bisection and the binary lottery method. The bisec-
tion method determines the mean point in utility between the two 
monetary amounts only by the utility function of money with the 
following formula: u(M) = 0.5*u(x1). In the binary lottery method 
the CE is determined by the utility function of money and other 
factors connected with the risk of the lottery, like probability weight-
ing in Prospect Theory. According to Prospect Theory the CE is: 
u(CE) = Π(0.5)*u(x1). The difference between both formulas is 
obvious: the weighting of probabilities Π(prob). Using the formula 
of Prospect Theory we would expect the CE and the mean point in 
the bisection task M to be equal if we assume Π(0.5) = 0.5. Here, 
only the utility function of money determines the CE.
In our investigation behavioral as well as ERP data suggest that 
both methods used are resulting in similar utility functions for 
money. Although there are visible differences between the bisec-
tion and the binary lottery task’s indifference point, indicating risk 
avoidance, the statistical analyses revealed that these differences are 
absolutely not signiﬁ  cant. The corresponding ERPs for decisions 
around the indifference point of the bisection and the lottery task 
(see Figure 5C) are also indicating, that action monitoring proc-
esses are not differentially engaged in the related decision mak-
ing processes. Postulating the bisection method captures utility 
of money itself and, as argued previously, the binary lottery the 
combination of utility and risk, an implication of our ﬁ  nding is 
FIGURE 6 | ERN topography. Topographies for the lottery conditions left) 
choice money [−100; −400] and right) choice lottery [bin 100; 390] are shown. 
The line graph depicts the mean amplitudes of the response-locked ERPs at 
CZ per category. Circles referring to “YES”-, squares to “NO”-responses.
FIGURE 5 | Response-locked event related potentials for the lottery’s task endpoints (A), the bisection’s task endpoint (C) and the indifference point for all 
conditions (D) at Cz are shown. (B) Depicts the lottery’s task ERPs which are corresponding to the bins equidistant to the indifference point [bin 70;340] and choice 
money [−130;−400].Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 43  |  8
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that utility function and probability weighting can be separated by 
initially determining the utility function with the bisection method 
and afterwards using the obtained function as input in the lottery 
method to get the lottery’s probability weighting experimentally. 
This procedure could also be applied to lotteries with probabilities 
different from 0.5 and would allow for a more precise discrimina-
tion between effects of the probability weighting and utility func-
tion for money. The same procedure allows for the separation of 
other effects related to risk and not to money evaluation as well. 
For example, the implications of Regret or Disappointment Theory 
can be tested more easily by a combination of these two methods, 
since the result of the determination of the utility function can be 
used in the analysis of the lottery method. In general, using both 
methods and looking at the differences helps to characterize situa-
tions connected with risk (money and probabilities) in comparison 
to situations connected with certainty (money only).
     It is important to note that ERNs were observed in the lottery 
condition even though money was not paid. As we stated previously, 
this indicates that despite the absence of real payoffs the choices made 
in the lottery task were subjectively more engaging compared to the 
bisection task and impelled participants to control their behavior to 
a larger extend. Assuming that hypothetical payoffs are less engaging 
then real payoffs, one would expect an increase in subjective relevance 
for real payoffs and therefore increasing ERN amplitudes. In line with 
the argumentation by Hewig et al. (2007) subjective relevance of 
an intended behavioral outcome is one factor that drives sensitivity 
for risk related choices. Therefore, we believe that it is justiﬁ  ed to 
ascribe the hypothesized ERN amplitude increase for lotteries with 
real payoffs partially to an altered perception of risk.
According to standard economic theory of risky decision 
  making the choice of an individual is solely determined by con-
sequences and probabilities entailed in a decision. The inﬂ  uence 
of time between the presentation of the problem, the decision 
and the realisation of the outcome is very often neglected. In 
the present study we showed that the temporal resolution of 
the ERP method and its ability to reveal cognitive processes that 
are not directly linked to perceivable behavior make it possible 
to identify the point in time at which post-decision evaluation 
processes takes place. That is, if the performed choice ﬁ  ts the 
subject’s response strategies and ﬁ  nally their long-term goals 
(Albers et al., 2000).
In summary, we have shown that the combination of the bisec-
tion and the binary lottery task allows to separate probability 
weighting and the perception of risk in the determination of util-
ity functions for money. We characterized common properties and 
differences of these two methods. Our ERP results are also indi-
cating, that disadvantageous choices in the risky decision making 
task are processed differentially by cognitive action monitoring 
processes. Since we found no evidence for differences around the 
indifference point at the behavioral or the neural level the use of 
both methods to determine the utility of money will result under 
the given conditions in similar estimates.
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